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THE STATUS OF RESCINDING SECURITY HOLDERS IN
BANKRUPTCY-THE PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY
ACT OF 1973 AND ALTERNATIVES
A fruitful parent of injustice is the tyranny of concepts. They are
tyrants rather than servants when treated as real existences and developed
with merciless disregard of consequences to the limit of their logic.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States2
submitted its recommendations for revising the federal bankruptcy law
to the President, the Congress, and the Chief Justice of the United States
on July 30, 1973.1 The Commission's Report contained novel and
controversial suggestions for both procedural changes in bankruptcy
administration and substantive changes in the law of bankruptcy.4 One
1. B. CARDozo, THE PARADOXES OF LErAL ScIENcE 61 (1928) (footnotes omitted).
2. In 1970, Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States [hereinafter referred to as the Commission] and extended its life by
amendment of the Act in 1972 and 1973. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354,
84 Stat. 468, as amended, Act of March 17, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-251, 86 Stat. 63, as
amended, Act of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-56, 87 Stat. 140. The Commission con-
sisted of nine members. The President appointed Harold Marsh Jr., Charles Seligson,
and J. Wilson Newman. The Chief Justice of the United States appointed Judges Ed-
ward Weinfeld and Hubert L. Will. The President of the Senate appointed Senators
Quentin Burdick and Marlow Cook. The Speaker of the House appointed Representa-
tives Don Edwards and Charles Wiggins.
3. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRuPTCY LAWS OF TE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as COM-
MISSION REPORT]. The COMMISSION REPORT consists of three parts. Part I states the
Commission's view of the problems found in the present bankruptcy law and its solutions
to those problems. Part H contains the text of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973
and proposed amendments to the Internal Revenue Code and the Judicial Code. Part
I consists of reports and summaries of the reports used by the Commission.
4. See generally Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Re-
organizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 651 (1974); Bobier, Proposed Revision of the Bank-
ruptcy Act: A Critique, 28 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 19 (1973); Brudney, The Bankruptcy
Commission's "Modifications" of the Absolute Priority Rule, 48 Am. BANKm. L.J. 305
(1974); Coogan, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Questions for the Non-Bank-
ruptcy Business Lawyer, 29 Bus. LAw. 729 (1974); Cyr, The Bankruptcy Act of
1973: Back to the Drafting Board, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 45 (1974); Francis, The
Commercial Secured Creditor and the Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 28 PERS. FIN. L.Q.
REP. 55 (1973); Kennedy, The Report of the Bankruptcy Commission: The First
Five Chapters of the Proposed New Bankruptcy Act, 49 IND. L.J. 422 (1974);
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of the recommended changes, section 4-406(a)(1) of the Proposed
Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 5 has far-reaching implications for both the
security holders of a bankrupt corporation and the continued vitality of
the policies underlying present securities laws. This section provides for
the subordination of "any claim for rescission of the purchase of securi-
ties issued by the debtor corporation or for damages resulting from the
purchase or sale of such securities."' Since it is ordinarily unlikely that
the assets of a bankrupt corporation will be sufficient to pay the claims
of general creditors, whose claims are superior to rescission claims of
security holders, the practical effect of the proposed statute would be to
prevent the satisfaction of rescission claims that are protected by the
securities laws. Moreover, this section fails to distinguish adequately
among the various positions of bankruptcy claimants.
This Note will examine the present law on the status of security
holders' rescission claims in bankruptcy and analyze the various propos-
als for limiting such claims and the advisability of accommodating the
bankruptcy and securities laws.
II. LEGAL BASES FOR SECURITY HOLDERS' RESCISSION CLAIMS
A. Federal Law
A security holder's right to rescind his purchase against the issuing
corporation may arise because (1) the security was sold without being
King, The Business Reorganization Chapter of the Proposed Bankruptcy Code-
Or Whatever Happened to Chapters X, XI and XII, 78 CoM. L.. 429 (1973);
Lavien, Water a Myth and Watch It Grow, 79 CoM. L.J. 116 (1974); Twinem,
Bankruptcy Report: Some Limitations on Creditors' Rights, 29 Bus. LAw. 353
(1974); Walker, An Introduction to the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973: From
Revision to Revolution, 41 TENN. L. Rnv. 635 (1974); Weintraub & Crames, Cri-
tique of Chapter VI and Related Sections of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of
1973, 48 AM. BANKRx. L. 1 (1974); Weintraub & Levin, Chapter VII (Reorganiza.
tions) as Proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission: The Widening Gap Between
Theory and Reality, 47 AM. BANKR. L.J. 323 (1973); Symposium, Bankruptcy Re-
form-1973, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 381 (1973); Note, The Proposed New Bankruptcy
Act, 7 IND. L. REv. 852 (1974).
5. CoMI~ssioN REPORT, pt. II, at 115.
6. Id. Section 4-406(a) (2) provides for subordination of "any claim, whether se-
cured or unsecured, of any principal officer, director, or affiliate of a debtor, or of any
member of the immediate family of such officer, director, or affiliate . . . ." Id. For
some discussion, see King & Rosen, An Introduction to the Proposed Bankruptcy
Act of 1973, 79 CoM. LJ. 472 (1974). This section also has relevance to securities
law, but is beyond the scope of this Note.
7. See Walker, supra note 4, at 655-56. For the purposes of this Note, the terms
"security holder" and "rescinding security holder" shall refer only to the holders of
equity securities.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/3
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properly registered or exempted from registration, (2) the transaction in
which the security was sold was not exempt, or (3) the security was
offered by means of a defective prospectus or misleading informationYs
Section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 19339 (Securities Act) imposes
strict liability on the seller of a nonregistered, nonexempt security.10
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act1 imposes liability on a seller who
sells the security through the use of information that is either untrue or
contains a misleading omission.' 2 Under section 12, a party may sue
for rescission and recover the consideration paid for the securities, or sue
for damages if the securities were disposed of prior to suit.' 3 Likewise,
among other possibilities, a defrauded security holder may sue the
issuing corporation for rescission or damages' 4 under section 17(a) of
the Securities Act' 5 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
10b-5. 6
8. Section 3 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1970), describes exempted
securities and section 4 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1970), describes exempted
transactions. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970), sets out
the basic prohibitions against offering or selling securities without their registration.
Section 5 also requires that offerees be provided prospectuses. See generally 1 L. Loss,
SECuRII Es REGULATION 178-206 (2d ed. 1961).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970).
10. See 3 L. Loss, SECURnEs REGULATION 1692-93 (2d ed. 1961).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
12. See 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION 1699 (2d ed. 1961).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970). See 3 L. Loss, SEcURrTIES REGULATION 1721 (2d ed.
1961).
14. For a discussion of § 17(a) of the Securities Act, see Globus v. Law Research
Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); B & B
Investment Club v. Kleinerts, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720, 726 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Reid v.
Mann, 381 F. Supp. 525, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Crowell v. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R.,
373 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp.
890, 903 (D. Me. 1971); Weber v. CMP Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp.
416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), pro-
vides for liability in the event "any part of the registration statement, when such part
became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state
a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading. . . ." Section 11 provides only for damages. For a discussion of dam-
ages available in suits based upon SEC Rule 10b-5, see 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURrnEs
LAW: FPAuD-SEC RULE 10b-5 §§ 9.1, 9.2 (1971); 3 L. Loss, SEcURITIES REGULATION
1792-97 (2d ed. 1961).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
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B. State Law
All states regulate securities transactions under some kind of blue sky
law.17  These laws generally require registration before the offer and
sale of securities and prohibit the use of fraudulent or misleading
information in the sale of securities.' 8 Actions for rescission or dam-
ages are normally provided for violations of state blue sky laws.'0
C. Common Law
A security holder also may have a claim based on the common law
actions of deceit20 or rescission. 2' The Securities Act and most state
blue sky laws specifically provide that their remedies are in addition to
those available at law or in equity,22 and therefore, a security holder's
right to base his claim on a common law action has not been abridged.
D. Categories of Rescission Claims Under Securities Law
The basic policy of federal securities law is to give investors adequate
information to enable them to make an informed purchase decision. 23
Rescission remedies were incorporated in the statutory scheme to effec-
tuate this policy. Therefore, a security purchaser who either did not
receive the required information or received misinformation is entitled to
rescind his purchase.24  To insure further that the required information
is made available, the securities laws incorporated a vast array of
registration and reporting requirements. 2  The issuer's failure to follow
17. See CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. for a collection of current state blue sky laws. See
generally L. Loss & E. Cownrr, BLUE SKY LAW (1958).
18. See 3 L. Loss, SEcURtmIS REGuLATION 1631-82 (2d ed. 1961).
19. Id. at 1638-39. See also Slain & Kripke, The Interface Between Securities Reg-
ulation and Bankruptcy-Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Secu-
rityholders and the Issuer's Creditors, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 261, 266 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Slain & Kripke].
20. See 3 L. Loss, SEctuomas REGULArION 1628 (2d ed. 1961).
21. Id. at 1626-27. See generally Shulman, Civil Liability and The Securities Act,
43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933) (discussion of common law actions as they relate to securi-
ties).
22. Securities Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1970); UNIFORM SEcuRrrms AcT § 409
(h).
23. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); SEC Securities Act Release No.
1 (May 27, 1933); 1 L. Loss, SEculrrms REGULAON 184-85 (2d ed. 1961).
24. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text.
25. See generally 2 L. Loss, SEcunrrms REG Ai oN 784-827 (2d ed. 1961).
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these requirements also may provide purchasers of the corporation's
securities with rescission claims.26
Rescission claims can be divided into two broad categories under the
securities laws. Those claims based on either the issuer's failure to
provide a purchaser with the required information or the provision of
misinformation will be referred to as claims based on informational
defects. Those claims based on the issuer's failure to follow the regis-
tration and reporting requirements of the securities laws will be referred
to as claims based on noninformational defects.2 7  Obviously, there are
many situations in which a rescission claim may fall into both catego-
ries.28  This distinction, developed more fully in this Note, will be
important in determining the extent to which the rescission claimant will
be allowed to share in the assets of the bankrupt corporation.29
Im. PRESENT STATUS OF RESCISSION CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
A. The Absolute Creditor Priority Rule
A basic maxim of bankruptcy law is that general creditors take prior
to equity holders in a corporate bankruptcy. The Supreme Court in
1899 stated that "the familiar rule [is] that the stockholder's interest in
26. Section 12(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970), makes it unlaw-
ful to sell an unregistered security that is not exempt from registration.
27. Claims based on noninformational defects are those claims in which the facts
that must be alleged in the suit for rescission need not include allegations of misstatement
or omission by the seller. A third situation is also possible, in which an issuer failed
to provide accurate information required in a registration statement or report, and this
failure deprived an investor of information upon which he would otherwise have relied.
Because in this situation the failure involves more than a failure to register, this situation
will be classed with claims based on informational defects. For further discussion and
analysis of the distinction between claims based on informational defects and those based
on noninformational defects see notes 133-138 infra and accompanying text.
28. A claim based upon the seller's failure to register could be advanced by a pur-
chaser who had also been defrauded. Under section 12(1) a purchaser need only show
a lack of registration and the nonexempt status of the security and the transaction in
which it was sold. A suit based on fraud must allege the informational defect. It ap-
pears likely that a claimant who could rescind on both bases would plead both bases
but rely upon the former as a matter of convenience.
It could be argued that the existence of a noninformational defect is information the
purchaser should possess, and therefore, all rescission claims are based on informational
defects. This argument, however, fails to recognize the compliance policy that underlies
some rescission claims. Claims based upon informational defects recognize only the un-
derlying securities policy of providing purchasers with adequate information prior to the
purchase decision.
29. See notes 86-89 infra and accompanying text.
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the property is subordinate to the rights of creditors; first of secured,
and then of unsecured. . .. ,,30 This doctrine has been reaffirmed on
many occasions and has come to be known as the absolute creditor
priority rule. 1 The rationale for the rule appears to stem from the
relationship between the equity holder and the corporation in which he
invested. The purchase of a corporation's equity securities entitles the
purchaser to share in the corporation's earnings and profits, and makes
the purchaser liable to the corporation's creditors up to the amount of
his investment.3 2 Therefore, if the corporation becomes bankrupt, the
equity holder cannot be allowed to compete with creditors for the
limited funds available.
Since the establishment of the absolute creditor priority rule, com-
mentators have recognized another reason for its existence. Creditors
of a corporation extend credit, either directly or indirectly, in reliance
upon the equity base reflected in the corporation's books. 3  A creditor
views the equity base as insurance that, if the corporation becomes
insolvent, there will be some funds to pay the debt owed to him. Thus,
a creditor's willingness to extend credit is directly related to the amount
of the equity base.34
Consequently, there are two rationales for the present use of the
absolute creditor priority rule. First, since an equity purchaser has
made a conscious decision to assume the inherent risks of an equity
holder, he should be bound by his decision. Second, since creditors rely
on the equity base of the corporation to determine whether to extend
credit, their reliance should be protected. As will be shown, however,
this rule does not always prevent a rescinding equity security holder
from sharing ratably in the assets of the insolvent corporation with the
general creditors.
30. Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry., 174 U.S. 674, 684 (1899).
31. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case
v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). These cases involved reorgan-
ization proceedings in which an attempt was made to avoid the rule. See also Spitzer
v. Stichman, 278 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1960). From the Court's discussions, it is clear
that this rule is applicable in a straight bankruptcy proceeding.
32. This is the basic concept of limited shareholder liability. See generally Note,
Limited Liability in Commercial Enterprises, 57 COLuM. L. REv. 83 (1957).
33. See Slain and Kripke, supra note 19, at 288-89. See also cases cited at note 55
infra (examples of the application of the rule on the basis of creditor reliance).
34. Within certain bounds this proposition is axiomatic. A creditor will not extend
credit to a small closely held corporation with limited equity in the amount it would
to General Motors.
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B. Claims Given General or Secured Creditor Status
Upon bankruptcy, claimants both must prove their claims35 and have
them allowed3" before they can share in the assets of the bankrupt. A
security holder with a rescission claim against a bankrupt corporation
must file a "proof of claim" in the bankruptcy court to establish that he
will attempt to gain general creditor status.37 The Supreme Court in
Oppenheimer v. Harriman National Bank & Trust Co.3 s held that a
rescinding shareholder was entitled to share equally with general credi-
tors in the assets of an insolvent bank.39 Oppenheimer dealt with the
issue whether a shareholder should be allowed to forgo his status as an
equity holder and gain general creditor status when his claim was based
upon common law fraudulent misrepresentations. The Court held that
because the bank was liable in rescission, the shareholder should be
given general creditor status. 0 Several lower courts have reached this
result by using a similar rationale,4 1 and the Securities and Exchange
Commission has lent support to this view in its Corporate Reorganiza-
tion Releases.42
35. Section 63 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1970), provides a list of
debts that may be proved. Proof of claim is the device by which a creditor enters his
claim before the bankruptcy court so that it may determine if a dividend will be allowed.
36. Section 57 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93 (1970), provides for allow-
ance of claims. The bankruptcy court may consider the equities of the case in determin-
ing whether to grant the creditor his claim out of the bankrupt's assets under § 57(k),
11 U.S.C. § 93 (k) (1970). See also notes 48-57 infra and accompanying text.
37. See Schrag & Ratner, Caveat Emptor-Empty Coffer: The Bankruptcy Law
Has Nothing to Offer, 72 COLUM. L. Rav. 1147, 1170 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Schrag & Ratner].
38. 301 U.S. 206 (1937).
39. 301 U.S. at 215. Since Oppenheimer the Supreme Court has not dealt with this
issue. The issue arose in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), but was held to
have been premature.
40. The Court, however, did allude to certain facts that could adversely affect the
nature of the claim. For example, if there had been a long delay in bringing the claim
after knowledge of the facts, or if the claim were based on a ground other than fraud,
the outcome of the case might have been different. 301 U.S. at 214 (1937). See notes
48-64 infra and accompanying text.
41. See Woods v. Deck, 112 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1940); Flor v. Jandreu, 15 F.2d
765 (5th Cir. 1926); Davis v. Louisville Trust Co., 181 F. 10 (6th Cir. 1910); Cawthon
v. Bancokentucky Co., 52 F.2d 850, 852 (W.D. Ky. 1931); In re Bancunity Corp.,
36 F.2d 595, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). SEC v. Insurance Investors Trust Co., [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,259 (W.D. Ky. 1971), explicitly followed
Oppenheimer. See also 3A W. COLLmR, BANKRUPTCY % 59.06 (14th ed. 1975).
42. See SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 310, at 41 (Mar. 16, 1972);
SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 226, at 13-14 (Mar. 8, 1965).
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As an alternative, the rescinding equity security holder may file a
petition for reclamation in the bankruptcy court43 to establish that he
will use tracing principles to gain secured creditor status.4 By tracing
the funds he used to purchase the security, the rescinder can have a
constructive trust in these funds established for his benefit.45 Although
there is precedent that a rescinding equity security holder who success-
fully traces his funds may take as a priority creditor,46 success is unlikely
because to obtain secured creditor status he must identify the actual
funds he used to purchase the securities.4 7
C. Claims Subordinated
Section 65(a) of the Bankruptcy Act48 states that "[d]ividends of an
equal per centum shall be declared and paid on all claims except such as
have priority . . . ,,49 It would appear, therefore, that all provable
rescission claimants should be allowed to take as general creditors. 0
Section 2(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1 however, confers on bankruptcy
courts "such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to
exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings under this Act ....
This language has been interpreted to mean that bankruptcy courts are
courts of equity.53 As courts of equity, bankruptcy courts could subor-
dinate security holder rescission claims.
43. See Schrag & Ratner, supra note 37. Filing one kind of claim or the other may
constitute an election of remedies. Therefore, the security holder should file in the al-
ternative both a "proof of claim" and a "petition for reclamation." See 4A W. COLLIER,
BAN URpTCy 70.39[4] at 479, 70.41[2] at 498 (14th ed. 1975).
44. See Schrag & Ratner, supra note 37.
45. RxSTATEzmNT OF REsTrrutnON §160 (1937) provides for the creation of a con-
structive trust in favor of one whose property is in the hands of another who would be
unjustly enriched if he were allowed to retain the property. See also REsTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 476 (1932); 12 S. WILiSTON, A TRF-ATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1500 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1970).
46. See In re Rhine, 241 F. Supp. 86 (D. Col. 1965) (court allowed rescinding pur-
chasers of working interests in an oil and gas enterprise to trace their funds and attain
secured creditor status). Cf. Schrag & Ratner, supra note 37. But see In re Morris
Bros., Inc., 293 F. 294, 296 (9th Cir. 1923) (even if funds are traceable, rescinding
shareholder cannot establish trust against those who became creditors while rescinder
was shareholder) (dictum).
47. The problems with the various theories of tracing are beyond the scope of this
Note. For elucidation see Schrag & Ratner, supra note 37, at 1153-56; Slain & Krpke,
supra note 19 at 272-79.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1970).
49. Id.
50. See notes 35-47 supra and accompanying text.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1970).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/3
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Generally, claims of rescinding equity security holders could be sub-
ordinated in three situations. First, the court could subordinate the
rescission claim of a security holder who was aware of his rescission
right, but continued to collect dividends or to participate in sharehold-
ers' meetings. 54  Second, the court could subordinate the rescission
claim of a security holder if there was creditor reliance on the apparent
equity base provided by the rescinder's purchase. 55 Third, the court
arguably could subordinate the rescission claim of a security holder if
the claim were based on a violation of the registration provisions of the
securities laws.56 It should be emphasized that there has been no
consistent application of the bankruptcy courts' power to subordinate
rescission claims of security holders.57
D. Claims Disallowed
Some courts have disallowed a rescission claim when the claimant has
either collected dividends or participated in the management of the
corporation after he had knowledge of his claim. 58 In some cases these
acts by the security holder would not affect the validity of his rescission
claim outside the context of bankruptcy because the securities laws deny
the defenses of laches and estoppel to defendants in rescission suits.59
54. In re Groenleer-Vance Furniture Co., 23 F. Supp. 713, 715 (W.D. Mich. 1938);
cf. Horn v. Abts, 19 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1927); Ratcliff v. Clendenin, 232 F. 61 (8th
Cir. 1916); In re National Pressed Brick Co., 212 F. 878 (6th Cir. 1914). Although
in these cases the courts disallowed the claims, they could have used the same rationale
to subordinate them. See cases cited note 58 infra and accompanying text.
55. See In re Morris Bros., Inc., 293 F. 294 (9th Cir. 1923); In re Groenleer-Vance
Furniture Co., 23 F. Supp. 713, 715 (W.D. Mich. 1938); cf. Julian v. Stewart, 56 F.2d
32 (5th Cir. 1932); Horn v. Abts, 19 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1927). The Julian and Horn
cases resulted in the disallowance of the claims. Subordination would have been a more
appropriate result.
56. Cf. Lincoln Theatres Corp. v. Fleming, 66 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1933); In re R.
Rombach & Co., 9 F.2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1925).
57. See 3A W. COLLmER, BANKRUPTCY 63.06, at 1784 & nn. 26 & 27 (14th ed.
1975); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 989 (1957).
58. See Julian v. Stewart, 56 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1932); Horn v. Abts, 19 F.2d 350
(8th Cir. 1927); Ratcliff v. Clendenin, 232 F. 61 (Sth Cir. 1916).
59. See Note, Applicability of Waiver, Estoppel, and Laches Defenses to Private
Suits Under the Securities Act and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5: Deterrence and Equity in Bal-
ance, 73 YALE L.J. 1477 (1964). These defenses are not available generally in registra-
tion suits because such suits are based upon the in terrorem policy inducing compliance.
Id. at 1481, 1484. See also L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATON 1693-94 (2d ed. 1961).
These defenses, however, have been available sporadically in suits for both informational
and noninformational defects. See Note, supra at 1477 n.6, citing Royal Air Properties,
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There appears to be no valid rationale for the disallowance of claims
against which no defense would exist outside the context of bankrupt-
cy.60 When allowance of a claim would constitute an injustice to other
claimants, subordination is the proper remedy in equity.0 1 Disallow-
ance of a claim denies the claimant any relief even if the assets of the
bankrupt are more than sufficient to satisfy fully all priority, general,
and subordinated claims.62  Subordination, however, merely denies the
claimant a dividend until those who have been determined to be in an
equitably superior position are fully satisfied. 3 By subordinating rather
than disallowing claims of rescinding equity security holders, a bank-
ruptcy court would not find itself in conflict with the policies of securi-
ties laws that deny corporations certain defenses to such claims.0 4
IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES FOR DETERMINING THE STATUS OF
RESCINDING SECURITY HOLDERS IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Slain-Kripke Proposal
Professors Slain and Kripke proposed an analysis for limiting the
claims of rescinding security holders in corporate bankruptcies.0 5 They
framed the issue as one of risk allocation in which the risk of both
business insolvency and an illegal securities issuance is allocated be-
tween creditors of the bankrupt and rescinding shareholders.00 To
reach an equitable balance Professors Slain and Kripke relied on the
traditional absolute creditor priority rule,T the possible leverage of a
Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962), Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling
Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961), and Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F.2d 855 (2d Cir.
1956).
60. See 3 W. COLLmER, BANKRUPTCY 57.14 (14th ed. 1975); 3A id. 63.03; Herzog
& Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 VA,'. L. Rnv.
83 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Herzog & Zweibel]; Hill, The Eric Doctrine in Bank-
ruptcy, 66 HARv. L. Rav. 1013 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Hill].
61. See Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 60, at 113.
62. Cf. Hill, supra note 60, at 1049.
63. Id. This is, however, the same as disallowance in a straight bankruptcy. See
Walker, supra note 4. In a reorganization case it may be very important to be subor-
dinated rather than disallowed because a subordinated claimant may still participate,
while a disallowed claimant cannot.
64. For example, defenses are denied to defendants in suits brought under § 12(1)
of the Securities Act to insure the effectuation of the in terrorem policy underlying those
claims. See Note, supra note 59, at 1481.
65. Slain & Kripke, supra note 19.
66. Id. at 286.
67. The absolute creditor priority rule refers to the basic distributional rule devel-
oped by the Supreme Court in Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/3
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security holder who had knowledge of his rescission right,6 and the
proposition that creditors rely on the apparent equity base of a debtor
corporation in deciding whether to extend credit. 69
Using these factors, the authors' proposal emphasizes creditor reliance
on the debtor's equity base to determine the equitable balance between
the competing classes of claimants. 7" First, the authors would establish
a rebuttable presumption that post-issuance creditors relied on the ap-
parent equity base resulting from prior security issues.71 If a rescinding
equity security holder is to share equally with a post-issuance creditor, he
must rebut the presumption of creditor reliance.72  Conversely, a pre-
issuance creditor is presumed not to have relied on the equity base
resulting from a later security issue.73 Therefore, a pre-issuance credi-
tor must prove his reliance to take prior to security purchasers with
rescission claims resulting from a particular issue of securities. 4 For
example, a pre-issuance creditor could prove reliance by showing that in
reliance on the new equity base he extended repayment dates or granted
further credit before the previous debt was satisfied.
The Slain-Kripke proposal would also incorporate the defenses of
laches78 and estoppe 76 to prevent a claimant from using his claim as
(1941), and Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). The rule
provides that senior interests are to be paid in full before junior interests receive any
dividends. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
68. This leverage refers to the possibility that a security holder who has a rescission
claim can either wait to bring his claim if the corporation begins to have difficulty or
forego rescission if the company prospers.
69. See Slain & Kripke, supra note 19, at 288-91.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 289.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 291. This defense applies to the timing of the claim. It would prevent
the security holder from using his right to rescind as a device to wait and see how the
investment develops. The statute of limitations for claims under sections 11 and 12 of
the Securities Act is as follows:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section
[11] or [12(2)] . . . unless brought within one year after the discovery of the
untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been
made . . . or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under section
[12(1)] . . . unless brought within one year after the violation upon which it
is based. In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability
created under section [11] or [12(1)] . . . more than three years after the
security was bona fide offered to the public, or under section [12(2)] . . .
more than three years after the sale.
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leverage after he has discovered the claim. Finally, the proposal would
prohibit the use of tracing doctrines by rescinding security holders in
order to prevent the rescinders from attaining secured creditor status. 77
The authors' proposed distribution formula, however, would effec-
tively negate any claim by a rescinding equity security holder, regardless
of creditor reliance. Their proposal produces this result by implying an
assignment of all assets initially distributed to rescinding security holders
to those creditors who have shown that they relied on the equity base
represented by the securities being rescinded. 78 This result can be
illustrated by the following hypothetical. Assume that after all costs
and priority claims have been paid7" the remaining assets total $300,-
000. Assume further that relying creditors" have claims in the amount
of $500,000; nonrelying creditors81 have claims in the amount of
$300,000; and rescinding security holders have claims in the amount of
$200,000. Relying creditors would receive a dividend of $150,000(300,000 X $500,000/$1,000,000),2 nonrelying creditors would re-
ceive a dividend of $90,000, and rescinding equity security holders
would receive a dividend of $60,000. Then, the $60,000 dividend of
the rescinders would be equitably assigned to the relying creditors.
§ 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970). Professors Slain and Kripke suggest a reasonable time
limitation for bringing rescission claims in a bankruptcy situation. Moreover, "[ble-
cause there is no federal statute of limitations applicable to rule lob-5 or section 17
cases, a statute of the state in which the court sits is applied. These typically are longer
than the periods provided in the securities acts for express rights of action." Slain &
Kripke, supra note 19, at 290 n.97.
76. Id. at 281-84.
77. Id. at 294.
78. Id. at 295-96. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that the dividend of the
rescinding shareholders would be sufficient to satisfy fully the claims of relying general
creditors. Only if the relying general creditors were completely satisfied would the
rescinding security holders be allowed to participate.
79. Claims entitled to priority such as administration costs are set out in § 64 of
the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
80. Under the Slain-Kripke analysis relying creditors are those who either were able
to preserve the presumption that they relied on the equity base represented by the
rescinded shares or proved their reliance on an issuance of securities that took place
after they extended credit. See Slain & Kripke, supra note 19, at 289.
81. Nonrelying creditors are both those who did not rebut the presumption of non-
reliance on an issuance that was subsequent to their granting credit and those creditors
against whom the rescinder rebutted the presumption of reliance on an issuance that was
prior to their extension of credit. Id.
82. Under a pro rata distribution, each claimant's dividend equals the total asset to
be dispersed multiplied by the ratio of the particular claimant's claim to the total amount
of allowable claims.
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Rescinders would take nothing unless their dividend was greater than
the difference between the relying creditors' claims and dividends. As
Slain and Kripke admit, "[i]n practical terms . . . [rescinding share-
holders] will not participate at all in the overwhelming majority of
straight bankruptcies. 8 3
There are two assumptions implicit in the Slain-Kripke proposal.
First, it assumes that the absolute creditor priority rule should apply as
against an equity security holder who rescinds his purchase of securities.
The absolute creditor priority rule developed from the belief that be-
cause an equity purchaser took the risk of the corporation's failure, he
should not be allowed to compete with creditors in the event of bank-
ruptcy."4 Arguably, a rescinding equity security holder is no longer a
security holder upon the distribution of assets because his claim has
been proved and his purchase has been rescinded. Slain and Kripke
circumvent this argument by recognizing a second rationale for the
absolute creditor priority rule, namely, creditor reliance on the equity
base represented by the rescinded securities.8 5 By incorporating the
creditor reliance concept in their analysis, Slain and Kripke have justi-
fied the application of the absolute creditor priority rule to claims of
rescinding equity security holders.
Second, the authors assume that all rescission claims should be treated
similarly, and that the absolute creditor priority rule should be applied
uniformly. Security holder rescission claims, however, can be placed
into two categories: (1) claims under which the purchaser did not
have either adequate or truthful information necessary to make an
informed purchase decision, and (2) claims under which the purchaser
had adequate and truthful information, but the issuing corporation
failed to follow the registration requirements of the securities laws or the
misinformation it provided would not have affected the rescinder's
purchase decision.86 This distinction is important because the basic
rationale of the absolute creditor priority rule is that an equity holder is
a conscious risk taker who should not be allowed to forego the risk.8
83. Slain & Kripke, supra note 19, at 296.
84. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
85. Slain & Kripke, supra note 19, at 288-91.
86. See notes 23-29 supra and accompanying text.
87. The argument is that if the absolute creditor priority rule is based on the propo-
sition that an equity purchaser is a conscious risk taker, then there must be some test
for determining what constitutes risk taking. The word "conscious" implies that an ele-
ment of knowledge must be present. If under securities law the purchaser had inade-
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Rescission claims based on informational defects may evidence a lack of
information necessary to make an intelligent decision to accept the
equity risks, and thus show that the rescinder was not a conscious risk
taker8 s If such a security holder was not a conscious risk taker, an
equitable distinction between kinds of rescission claims becomes impor-
tant to the application of the absolute creditor priority rule."" In this
regard, the Slain-Kripke proposal is imprecise because it fails to recog-
nize an important distinction between different kinds of rescission
claims.
The implication of the Slain-Kripke proposal is that all policies
underlying securities law rescission claims should be subordinated to the
traditional bankruptcy policy of absolute general creditor priority over
claims by equity holders. 90 This implication ignores the inequity that
arises if a defrauded security holder is not allowed to pursue his claim
effectively simply because the issuing corporation went bankrupt. This
neglect of securities law policies invites a floundering corporation to
make a fraudulent issue to protect the postbankruptcy relationship
between corporate insiders and corporate creditors.91  This result is
possible largely because the authors' analysis attempts to extend the
concept of absolute creditor priority without any regard for the different
kinds of rescission claims.
B. Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, in
recommending section 4-406 (a) (1) of the Proposed Act, stated that
"claims by stockholders of a corporate debtor for rescission or damages,
which if allowed will promote them to the status of creditors, be
quate information to make an informed purchase decision, it can be argued that he also
had insufficient information to consciously assume the risk of an equity holder. The
quantum of information may be different in the two situations. See notes 134-38 inlra
and accompanying text.
88. See note 124 infra and accompanying text.
89. The application of the rule would vary with the allegation and proof of facts
that would establish whether the rescinder was a conscious risk taker. If the claim did
show such facts, then the court would not apply the rule.
90. Because of the proposed distributional formula, the practical result of the Slain-
Kripke analysis is that rescinding security holders will receive nothing. See Slain &
Kripke, supra note 19, at 296.
91. Under the Slain-Kripke approach, the general creditors who relied on the equity
represented by such an issuance of securities would receive a larger percentage of their
claims than they would have had there not been such an issuance.
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subordinated to the claims of the real creditors."92 Section 4-406(b) of
the Proposed Act provides that "[a]ny . .. trust securing a claim
subordinated under subdivision (a) [rescission claim] shall pass to
the trustee for the benefit of all claims allowed but not subordinated. 93
This provision prevents tracing, which might otherwise give the rescind-
ing security holder secured creditor status, because tracing results in an
equitable trust.94
The Commission's proposal is not discussed in its Report, and there-
fore, only speculation about the rationale for this proposal is possible.
The few commentators who have discussed these specific sections of the
Proposed Act assume that the Commission's rationale is based upon a
strict application of the absolute creditor priority rule in bankruptcy.95
This assumption seems correct because the Slain-Kripke article appears
to have been the only source material used by the Commission on this
issue." Basically, section 4-406 achieves the same result for equity
rescission claimants as the Slain-Kripke proposal97 without recognizing,
for analytical purposes, the equitable importance of actual creditor
reliance."8 Perhaps the Commission believed it was a needless gesture
to distinguish between rescission claims which, for all practical purposes,
would be subordinated. Consequently, the Commission's recommenda-
tion is subject to the same criticism as the Slain-Kripke proposal.99
The policy implication of the Proposed Act's approach is that once a
person becomes an equity holder, even if through the issuing corpora-
tion's fraud, he is treated as having made an informed decision to
92. COMMISSION REPORT, pt. I, at 22.
93. Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, § 4-406(b), COMNSSION REPORT, pt. II, at
115.
94. By tracing his funds in the issuer's possession, the rescinding security holder has
a right to the funds through the imposition of a constructive trust. See RESTATEMENT
OF REsTrruTioN § 160 (1937); Schrag & Ratner, supra note 37, at 1153.
95. See Walker, supra note 4, at 655. Cf. Coogan, supra note 4, at 737-38; King
& Rosen, supra note 6, at 474.
96. The Commission's Report does not cite any source material for this portion of
the Report. Professors Slain and Kripke, however, submitted a draft of their article to
the Commission. See Slain & Kripke, supra note 19, at 299-300.
97. In effect both approaches arrive at the same result; rescinding security holders
do not participate in the distribution of the assets of the bankrupt corporation.
98. Section 4-406 of the Proposed Act does not incorporate the Slain-Kripke creditor
reliance approach.
99. See notes 84-91 supra and accompanying text.
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assume the traditional risks that accompany the status of an equity
holder.10 This approach is susceptible of two explanations. First, the
Commission may have made a policy decision that the securities law
policy underlying rescission rights must be subordinated to the absolute
creditor priority policy of the bankruptcy law.101 Second, the Commis-
sion may have failed either to frame the issue properly or to consider the
policy conflict between the securities and bankruptcy laws. 02 Under
either explanation, it appears that a more careful consideration of the
problem is necessary before Congress adopts the Commission's recom-
mendation.
C. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Approach
The SEC has not promulgated a recommended solution to the issue of
a rescinding security holder's status in a corporate bankruptcy proceed-
ing. The SEC's probable position can be gleaned, however, from its
views expressed in Corporate Reorganization Releases'0 3 and its position
in litigation.104 In one release, the SEC held that a plan for corporate
reorganization was unfair when it did not allow shareholders to bring
actions for rescission based on both fraud and violations of the registra-
tion requirements of the securities laws. 05 In a second release quoted
by Slain and Kripke, 06 the SEC stated that security holder rescission
claims "are on parity with unsecured claims generally .. ,.0. Final-
ly, in SEC v. Insurance Investors Trust Co.,:08 the SEC supported the
position of the stockholders who argued that after establishing rescission
claims based on the bankrupt's fraudulent acts and violations of the
securities laws, the stockholders should share ratably with the general
100. The Proposed Act approach also contains the policy implication discussed in the
text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
101. This explanation is unlikely because the Commission did not discuss this issue
in its Report. It is reasonable to assume that if an extensive analysis of this issue had
been made, such analysis would be reflected in the Commission's Report.
102. The Securities and Exchange Commission was not asked to testify before the
Commission, and there is no source material listed by the Commission that presents the
policies of the securities laws.
103. See SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 310 (Mar. 16, 1972); SEC Cor-
porate Reorganization Release No. 226 (Mar. 8, 1965).
104. See SEC v. Insurance Investors Trust Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 93,259 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
105. See SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 226 (Mar. 8, 1965).
106. Slain & Kripke, supra note 19, at 270 & nn.38 & 39.
107. SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 310, at 41 n.32 (Mar. 16, 1972).
108. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fu. SEC. L. REP. 93,259 (W.D. Ky. 1971).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/3
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creditors.10 9 From these positions it can be inferred that the SEC
would support the proposition that all rescinders with proven claims,
regardless of the basis of the claim, creditor reliance, laches, or estoppel,
should be allowed to share pro rata with all other general creditors. 011
The basic assumption underlying the apparent position of the SEC is
that regardless of any conflict with other policies, the securities law
policy must be given effect. The implication of this view is that general
creditors must share with the rescinding equity security holders the risk
of an illegal securities issue by the debtor corporation."' Under this
view, an equity security holder with a valid rescission claim could use his
claim to escape the risks he intelligently undertook when he made his
purchase. 1 2 This result is possible because a rescission claim could be
based solely on a noninformational defect. Two explanations of the
SEC position are possible. First, the SEC may have taken the view that
its duty is to further the policies of the securities laws in all situations.
Second, the SEC may have made a policy decision that the equities favor
a rescinding security holder over a general creditor regardless of the
circumstances in which the conflict arises." 3
D. An Alternative Approach
The approaches discussed thus far present three contrasting views.
The first view is that some balance of the equities is necessary to
determine the application of the absolute creditor priority rule and
securities law policy, but subject to creditor reliance on the apparent
equity base provided by equity security purchases that are the focus of
109. Id.
110. See sources cited notes 105-09 supra and accompanying text. The SEC as of
yet, however, has not distinguished between claims brought on an antifraud theory and
claims based upon violations of the registration provisions of the securities laws.
I 1l. Since general creditor status is given to all rescinding security holders under the
SEC approach, both classes of claimants will share in the assets of the bankrupt. There-
fore, the risk of an illegal security issuance is also borne by rescinding security holders.
112. If the security holder's rescission claim was based on a violation of the registra-
tion provisions of the securities laws, adequate information may have been available to
him. Therefore, if he knew of his rescission claim and delayed in bringing it, he would
still have the right to rescind if the corporation experienced financial trouble, as long
as he did so within the period of the statute of limitations. But see note 75 supra and
accompanying text (application of the defense of laches in this situation).
113. This policy decision would be supported by the argument that all rescission
claims are based upon a lack of relevant information or that rescission is an effective
tool to induce compliance with the registration provisions of the securities laws.
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rescission claims.114 The second view is that the absolute creditor
priority rule should apply in all circumstances."- The third view is that
securities law policy should be paramount in all cases.'" The situation,
however, requires an alternative approach that will attempt to give effect
to both securities and bankruptcy law policies.
This alternative approach incorporates the creditor reliance analysis
proposed by Professors Slain and Kripke"17 with a distinction drawn
between rescission claims based on the policies underlying the securities
statutes that grant the rescission right. The two categories of rescission
claims are based on informational and noninformational defects." 8 The
former kind of claim provides relief to a purchaser who was unable to
make an informed purchase decision because of insufficient informa-
tion."19 The latter kind of claim acts in an in terrorem manner to insure
compliance with the registration and reporting requirements of the
securities laws. 20 This analysis also recognizes that the basis for the
absolute creditor priority rule is the purchaser's conscious decision to
accept the risks of an equity holder.121
There are four different situations in which a conflict between bank-
ruptcy law policy and securities law policy is present. First, there is the
situation in which an equity security holder whose rescission claim is
based on an informational defect is competing against a nonrelying
creditor.12  The rescinding security holder has not had adequate infor-
mation to make an informed decision to accept the risks of an equity
holder, 2 and therefore, the primary policy for the absolute creditor
114. Slain & Kripke, supra note 19.
115. Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, § 4-406, COMMISSION REPORT, pt. I, at 115.
116. This position is the Securities and Exchange Commission approach. See notes
105-14 supra and accompanying text.
117. Slain & Kripke, supra note 19, at 288-91.
118. See notes 23-29 supra and accompanying text.
119. See S. RP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); SEC Securities Act Release
No. 1 (May 27, 1933).
120. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); Note, supra note 59. For
the purposes of this Note, the term "in terrorem" will be used to signify the policy that
requires compliance with the securities laws in order to protect the securities markets
and to foster disclosure regardless of specific injury to investors through noncompliance.
See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 173 & n.7
(1933).
121. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
122. For explanation of the terms nonrelying and relying creditor, see notes 80-81
supra.
123. This assertion assumes that the same quantum and kind of information is nec-
essary both for a purchaser consciously to take the risks of an equity holder and to meethttp ://opensc olarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/3
SECURITIES REGULATION
priority rule is absent. Furthermore, since there is no creditor reliance,
the second rationale for the absolute creditor priority rule is also absent.
In this situation, the rescinding equity security holder should be allowed
to share ratably with the nonrelying general creditor.
The second, and most difficult, situation occurs when a security
holder with a rescission claim based oni an informational defect is
competing with a relying creditor. The rationale for the absolute
creditor priority rule based on conscious risk taking is absent, but the
rationale based on creditor reliance is present. Arguably, the rescission
claim should be subordinated because there is justification for applying
the absolute creditor priority rule. This result would, however, com-
pletely ignore the securities law policy to allow rescission when there is
an informational defect. It is proposed that the claimants should share
ratably in this instance. This result allows the relying creditor and the
rescinding equity security holder to share the risk of the corporation's
insolvency by receiving equal proportions of their respective claims. If
the rescinder's claim is subordinated, the total risk of insolvency falls on
him although he did not have sufficient information available conscious-
ly to take this risk.124  There is precedent for the proposition that
general creditors have some duty to investigate the possibility of an
illegal securities issuance by the debtor corporation.12 5 A creditor's
failure to discover such a defect provides another reason for requiring
him to share the risk of debtor insolvency. The proposed result is an
attempt to balance the conflicting policies in an equitable manner.
The third situation occurs when an equity security holder with a
rescission claim based upon a noninformational defect is competing with
a nonrelying general creditor. The investor has made an informed
the requirements of the securities laws. This appears to be a reasonable assumption be-
cause a purchaser with a rescission claim is allowed to forego the risks of being an equity
holder. By allowing a security purchaser the right to rescind on the basis of an informa-
tional defect, the law that grants the right appears to recognize implicitly the inability
of the rescinder consciously to have taken the risk of being an equity holder. It can
be argued, however, that the two policies of securities laws, see notes 23-29 supra and
accompanying text, overlap, and a rescission claim based on an informational defect is,
in part, based on the in terrorem policies of the securities laws. An alternative test for
determining what information is required for conscious risk taking is presented at notes
133-38 infra and accompanying text.
124. The risk would be on the rescinder because it would be unlikely that he would
share in the assets of the bankrupt, whereas the creditor would be allowed to participate.
125. See SEC v. Insurance Investors Trust Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fan. SEc. L. REP. % 93,259, at 91,533 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
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decision to take the risks of an equity holder. Since the creditor did not
rely on the equity base represented by the rescinded shares, however, the
absolute creditor priority rule is not completely relevant. The question
is whether the investor should be allowed to share in the assets of an
insolvent corporation although he has made an informed decision to risk
the complete loss of his investment. This situation does not justify
ignoring the in terrorem policy underlying this kind of rescission
claim. 26 It appears that the rescinding equity security holder should be
allowed to share ratably with a nonrelying general creditor. Since,
the creditor, at the time he extended credit, had no expectation that this
equity would be present, he is not actually injured by the result.
When a security holder whose rescission claim is based on a noninfor-
mational defect is competing with a relying creditor, the in terrorem
policy underlying the rescission claim should be subordinated. The
investor has made an informed decision to accept the risks of corporate
insolvency, and the creditor has relied on the equity base represented by
the purchase. Both rationales for the absolute creditor priority rule are
present and it should be applied. The indicated result is the subordina-
tion of the rescission claim.
Moreover, since there is no apparent reason for treating rescinding
security holders differently than other creditors seeking to use tracing,
rescinders should be allowed to use tracing to gain secured creditor
status.2 7 Finally, in order that the balance not swing too far, defend-
ants should be able to use laches and estoppe.' 8 against rescinding
security holders in a bankruptcy action. Once a security holder realizes
he has a claim for rescission and decides not to proceed with his claim, it
can be said that he has made a conscious decision to accept the risks of
an equity holder. 29  These defenses should not influence the provability
126. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text. The purchaser is allowed the
rescission right to further the basic securities law policy of disclosure. The creditor has
no equitable argument for claiming injury by the allowance of the rescission claim.
Therefore, the policy of the securities law should be furthered since rescission is not to
the detriment of bankruptcy law policy.
127. See notes 43-67 supra and accompanying text.
128. See note 59 supra.
129. It seems that by delaying the enforcement of his claim, the equity holder is mak-
ing the same decision as one who initially purchases securities. He is deciding to hold
the securities in the hope of receiving a profit through either dividends or an increase
in the securities' market value. At the same time, however, the possibility exists that
the corporation will fail and the equity holder will lose his investment.
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or allowability of the claim, 13 but rather, regardless of the actual basis,
should cause the claim to be treated as one based on a noninformational
defect.'
This recommended approach presents problems both in the distinc-
tion to be made between kinds of rescission claims and in the distribu-
tion of assets once the priorities are determined. In distinguishing
between rescission claims based on informational defects and those
based on noninformational defects, an attempt is being made to distin-
guish between purchasers with adequate information to accept the risks
of equity holders and those without such information. 3 ' The informa-
tion required by securities law, however, may exceed the information
required for the purchaser to make a conscious decision to assume the
risks of an equity holder.133 The securities laws are recognized as being
very broad because their purpose is to insure that adequate information
is dispersed to safeguard the entire system of public securities trading,
not just the individual purchaser.134  To protect creditors, however,
bankruptcy policy only requires that the purchaser have made a con-
scious decision to accept the equity risks. 3 " Arguably, less information
is required for a purchaser to make a conscious decision to accept the
equity risks than is required under securities law to protect the securities
market.136  Therefore, a "but for" test may be required. This test
would distinguish between rescission claims based on facts that, if
known, would not have altered the reasonably prudent purchaser's
decision to buy and those claims based on facts that, if known, would
have prevented the prudent purchaser from entering the transaction. 37
130. The claim is still valid, and defenses not allowed outside the context of bank-
ruptcy should not be allowed to defeat the claim in the context of bankruptcy. See notes
60-64 supra and accompanying text.
131. In other words, the claim should not be disallowed, but should be subordinated
to claims of relying creditors who can invoke the absolute creditor priority rule.
132. This is information that would have made a difference in the purchaser's deci-
sion to take the risks of an equity holder. The assumption is made that if all securities
laws are followed, adequate information is provided.
133. But see note 123 supra.
134. See S. RPP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
135. See Slain & Kripke, supra note 19, at 265, 268, 284-86. See also note 87 supra.
136. This argument is discussed in note 123 supra.
137. This test would insure that the securities laws would not define what informa-
tion is necessary for a purchaser to make a conscious decision to accept the risks of
an equity holder. It would, however, cause the bankruptcy court to examine the facts
underlying every rescission claim to decide if there existed conscious risk taking by the
purchaser.
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Another problem with the proposed analysis involves the distribution
of assets once the relative priorities of the claimants have been deter-
mined. Under the proposal, it is possible that a rescinding equity
security holder, whose claim is based on a noninformational defect,
would share pro rata with some general creditors and be subordinated to
others. 138 All general creditors, however, have a right to a pro rata
share in the bankrupt's assets. 13 9 To effectuate the distributional priori-
ties that result from the application of the proposed analysis, it is
necessary to incorporate an implied assignment. A portion of the assets
to which rescinding equity security holders, whose claims are based on
noninformational defects, are entitled, must be assigned to general credi-
tors who relied on the equity base provided by those rescinded shares. 40
For example, assume a straight bankruptcy in which secured parties and
section 64 priority claims are paid.' 41  Four classes of claimants re-
main:
1. Rescinding equity security holders whose claims are based on infor-
mational defects;
2. Rescinding equity security holders whose claims are based on non-
informational defects;;
3. General creditors who relied on the apparent equity base represented
by the securities being rescinded by class 2;
4. General creditors who did not rely on the equity base represented
by the securities being rescinded by class 2.
Assume further than each class has a claim of $150,000, and that the
remaining assets of the bankrupt are $100,000. Each class would
received a dividend of $25,000.42 Then, a percentage of the class 2
dividend equal to the proportion that the amount of relying general
creditor class (class 3) bears to the total general creditor claims (50%
in this example) " would be equitably assigned to the relying creditors.
138. For example, A extended credit, then an issue was sold that was technically de-
fective. B purchased, and then C extended credit. B would be entitled to a pro rata
share with A, but would be subordinated to C.
139. Bankruptcy Act § 65(a), 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1970).
140. This apportionment is necessary to insure that relying creditors are not penal-
ized by the allowance of rescission claims based on noninformational defects.
141. 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
142. Each class is entitled to 25% of the assets because each class has an equal claim
(25% of $100,000).
143. This proportion was selected because it seems to most realistically reflect the
equities of the analysis. Noninformational defect rescission claims should be allowed
to participate, but not to the detriment of relying creditors. Furthermore, nonrelying
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss5/3
SECURITIES REGULATION
The result would be that class I would receive a dividend of $25,000,
class 2 a dividend of $12,500, class 3 a dividend of $37,500, and class
4 a dividend of $25,000. This distribution formula would recognize
the validity of rescission claims based on noninformational defects,
but would also recognize the equitable rights of relying general creditors
to the equity base provided by rescinded stock purchases.
V. CONCLUSION
After years of contradictory treatment by the courts, a move is now
being made to enact a statutory solution to the issue of a rescinding
security holder's status in a bankruptcy proceeding. As has been
shown, this is an area in which two deep-rooted policies of law conflict.
To resolve this conflict satisfactorily, Congress must have a complete
understanding of the underlying policies. Apparently, neither the Com-
mission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States nor the Securities
and Exchange Commission has considered all the factors. Nevertheless,
their approaches to the problem highlight the strong arguments in favor
of both the bankruptcy and securities law policies. Their approaches,
however, offer easily applied solutions to a very difficult problem. The
solution to this issue is not simple, but rather must be an imaginative
one that will most effectively further the conflicting policies while being
flexible enough for application in all circumstances. The approach
suggested in this Note is not intended to be a perfect solution to the
problem. It is hoped that it will provide both a basis for further
alternatives, as the Slain-Kripke article did for this Note, and ultimately
a satisfactory statutory solution.
creditors should not be allowed to benefit from the equity added by the rescinded shares.
An alternative formula might assign fixed percentages of the bankrupt's assets to the dif-
ferent classes of claimants. Since the assets that remain in the corporation at bank-
ruptcy will not normally reflect any one security issuance, a percentage may be just as
effective to carry out the policy of the analysis.
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